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### Prospect for Indian philosophy

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#### Abstract

In the introductory re-mark to the book it is convincingly indicated: "A major theme throughout the book is the notion of a definite progress within the subject which, unlike the natural sciences, cannot be measured in a linear way but should be seen as the evolution of debate around a series of perennial problems to a point where the study of evidence has become the cardinal feature of modern philosophy". I can only add here that what is said by Ayer about the western philosophical trend is also applicable to Indian philosophy *mutatis mutandis* where, as said before, *pramana* or evidence *mutandis* is emphasized in all sorts of philosophical investigation. I do not agree with those who discount the need for an Indian tradition in modern philosophy on the plea that philosophy as quest for knowledge is, like science, a universal cultural activity without a national stamp. It seems to me that philosophy, as the inner awareness of a country's culture, stands somewhat between science and literature and as such a distinct product of that culture. For the distinctive character of *dharma*, see my paper: "Can Humanism be a substitute for religion?" which is one of the three papers for the Symposium under the same title at the 46th session of the Indian Philosophical Congress (Kanpur), published in the proceedings of the Congress, Sole Selling Agents.

**Keywords:** Debate around, problems, perennial, *mutandis*, emphasized

#### Introduction

It is felt that philosophy in India has got no definite shape or direction. Particularly it is observed that it does not have a distinctive character, which it really had in ancient days. First of all it is not clear as to what should be meant by definite shape or direction. Does it mean that Indian philosophy should have one unique trend by means of which it can be well distinguished in the international scene and all persons pursuing the study of Indian philosophy are to follow that course, or does it mean that though they may continue to have the pursuit of different approaches, they should ultimately stick to what may roughly be described as "Indian way of philosophising"? The former view, it seems, puts unwarranted restrictions to the Indian philosophers and this amounts to what may be called as a check on freedom of rational discourse that clearly is the prerogative of philosophical activity almost in the perennial sense. A philosopher is not limited by a particular set of ideas or thoughts. He may pick up any idea from the vast range of ideas in the entire conceptual framework and he is free enough to reflect over such idea with a view to arrive at further clarification or illumination. Any sort of imposition, brought at this point, would seriously affect the undisputed autonomy of philosophical enterprise itself. Philosophy is traditionally taken to be a theoretical reflective activity irrespective of the different standpoints that an individual philosopher prefers.

Here one may consider the second alternative according to which the Indian philosopher, though free to take up any approach must finally be restricted to what is hinted before "Indian way of philosophising". Now, what exactly can be implied by this form of expression? It may mean that recent Indian philosophers should evolve a specific type of philosophy which is to be duly recognised as distinctive in the international sphere. An indication is given that India did have a distinct philosophical tradition in the past and the Indian Philosophers today should develop some such tradition, or should bring out a new formulation keeping to the present need of socio-economic as well as national considerations. But here it again may be asked as to what is the distinct philosophy which India had in past.

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It is believed in certain circles that in past philosophy and religion are somehow intermingled and India has a tradition of establishing and popularising what may be called religious or spiritualistic philosophy. It is darshana and not philosophy. Here in this context it has been emphasised more than once that Indian philosophy in the traditional sense is darshana, having a practical bent towards attainment of life's goal unlike the western tradition which is solely restricted to mere theoretical enterprise and thus is devoid of life's interest. Dr. Devraja, one of the recent day thinkers on Indian philosophy, has said:

"Indian philosophy today does not represent any uniform mode of thought.....philosophy in India never found it necessary to estrange or alienate itself from religion. In India, religion cheerfully accepted the guidance of philosophy."

But while one looks dispassionately to the ancient Indian philosophical thought, one may find (I suppose) that religion in the western sense of the term is rather conspicuously absent. An attempt for theologically justifying the religious framework has never been found a major trend as it is found to be the case in the western counterpart particularly during the medieval period which has been characterised as predominantly theological and philosophy is said to have been under dark age, being a hand-maid of theology. From the very beginning, it is not the sense of religion rather that of dharma that occupies a principal role in the ancient Indian philosophical thought. Dharma is understood in the socio-cultural perspective as the basis for some cardinal principles. It is meant for unifying, integrating the mankind.<sup>3</sup> It has a deep rooted secular and empirical outlook whereas theology or religious framework is fundamentally non-secular and transcendental. Philosophy or what is known as darshana in this tradition has got nothing to do with theology. Darshana is, of course, found to have close link with dharma in this tradition thought never these two terms are used interchangeably. Darshana is meant to investigate certain conceptual issues in the pure rational and logical perspective and in this connection much emphasis has been accorded to pramana or evidence so far as this tradition is concerned. A logical evidence is always required either to affirm or to demolish a particular position in the sphere of darshana. And that is why an Indian philosophers (darshanikas) are identified as pramanikas who make a critical study of the concepts. The relation between dharma and darshana becomes meaningful only to the extent that the latter explores a conceptual scheme or pattern that is not in clash with the dharmic plane. And if at all there is a clash then somehow or other it is such darshanika point of view which suffer most. Here the Carvaka view-point may be considered. Its philosophy of empiricism based upon sense-perception when is found to have degenerated to a gross sensualistic hedonism and even goes to the extent of threatening the moral backbone of the social structure, it becomes very much denegated to the irrational plans being much removed from the original basis of anviksiki. Consequently it is attacked in the dharmic sector and that is why this degenerated form of Carvaka point of view perhaps could not flourish. A similar thing happened to a distorted deteriorated formulation of Buddha darshana (see jayans) in which sole emphasis was given on gross unrestricted sensualism at the expense of socio-moral solidarity. And consequently Buddha darshana suffered

heavily by losing its appeal in the socio-moral context. Another instance may be made about the Jaina darshana. The rigid practice of severe austerity when is too much emphasised, neglecting thereby the cause of man in the socio-empirical situation, it loses appeal both in the intellectual and in the common platform. The philosophic standpoint suffers only when it goes counter to the demands of dharma. In other words, it is not that religion in India cheerfully accepted the guidance of philosophy but rather darshana is never encouraged at the expense of dharma. However, let it not be understood that darshana means here to boost up a non-secular, supernatural attitude at the cost of human interest. It is primarily meant to safeguard the secular interest in the manner that is acceptable to morality as well as spirituality in the social plans.

The sense of theological God is found to be never defended in the so called orthodox tradition like Mimamsa, Advaita Vedanta, Sankhya and even Nyaya. The Soswara Sankhya is said to have been accommodating God which is not a theistic personal God but only in view as to relate the two independent uncreated entities like Purusa and Prakriti. The Naiyayika conception of God is only a non-creator God who is conceived in much different manner than that of theology.

Quite often ancient Indian philosophy has been characterised as spiritual. But what does it mean? Does it mean that Indian philosophy propagates the reality of the spiritual being as the only distinct entity? Such a conception has been in recent period exploded to be a myth. Each ancient Indian philosophical or darshanika system has, of course, distinct standpoints and each of them tries to argue out its own case by means of appealing to rational justification. Darshana is a theoretical enterprise in the same sense like that of philosophy and in that too and finds different philosophical formulations both in the field of metaphysics and epistemology. That is why in the ancient philosophical discussions one finds tracts of rationalism, empiricism, idealism, realism, monism, pluralism, phenomenalism, positivism, existentialism and so on and in all these, one thing is given supreme importance that is to decide the theoretical issues by means of appealing to reason or yukti. Even the so called orthodox philosophers, having their root in Vedas or Sruti, have clearly admitted that thousand Druti vakys cannot change the pot into a piece of cloth.

Therefore it seems that the remark that Indian philosophy in the past is distinguished by having one uniqueness which is not found elsewhere either in those days or in the present age is not convincing. As in outside so in India, philosophical discussions have been carried on in the same intellectual or theoretical platform and the deciding factor is in both cases reason. It is the same rational or logical consideration that occupies the eastern as well as western mind. Indian philosophy in the past like that of the west is found to have followed the same intellectual tradition of reflection. And whenever there is found to have been any deviation in any quarter, it is that deviation which suffers most and is gradually pushed to the background by the human and social demands.

But in spite of all this, it may be said that even though philosophy and darshana are on the same footing and the emphasis on the course of reason is felt in both the tradition, there is still some sort of Indian approach of philosophicalising. For it cannot neglect the cultural root in which Indian philosophical thinking is grounded. <sup>7</sup>

Philosophising cannot simply be opaque to cultural heritage. And in that context the particular social, economic and even national factors are looked into. India, too, in the recent past, has been faced with new problems and challenges in the national level concerning economic, sociological, ethnic and such other related issues. So at this stage Indian philosophers cannot simply be blind to all the current facets and be engaged in following the old dry logic chopping and sterile intellectual dialectics which are not in any manner relevant to the present world. In this connection it is said that present Indian approach should not be in terms of looking to the past and thinking thereby that the final truths have been spelled out by the ancient seers unco for all; and also it is not to simply aim at blind imitation of the western ideas.

Now it is, however, to be conceded that philosophical thinking either by one individual or by a group can become affected by the circumstantial factors. At least in the psychological plane the impact of the socio-economic conditions cannot be ruled out. Even here the political and national factors are to be considered. For instance, if the political set up does not allow the citizen of a particular country to move for a free thinking enterprise, surely philosophical reflection in that sense would be taking a particular shape and may not be able to get a scope to review the other possibilities which it could have done if the political control would not have been in such manner imposed. Some, particularly being influenced by the communistic political set up, have gone on to think that the so called freedom of thought is rather an outcome of capitalist propaganda. There are other moves too. While freedom is in such manner checked in the communistic framework, it is argued that such an outlook is the enemy of open society. So far as India is concerned, the socio-economic conditions of the people belonging to this sub-continent have to be looked into. Any kind of theoretical investigation cannot be undertaken without taking these aspects into account. India particularly, as many think, can neither embrace capitalism nor communism but that which is quite in keeping with the socio-economic basis and also its traditional spiritual heritage. It is thought in this regard that philosophers should exercise their own endeavour to chalk out such a freedom of vision or universal look which would cater to the need of present Indian socio-cultural, national-cum-political needs and requirements. In this connection it is thought that as the British philosophy is mostly identified with Empiricism or American philosophy is known to be pragmatic for instance, so also the Indians of the present must evolve some such philosophic outlook which would be purely distinctive of their own and at the same time it must meet to their national and other such demands as hinted before.

It is true that empiricism has its origin in Britain and so also pragmatism in America. But does this necessarily suggest that each British or American philosopher is committed either to empiricistic or to pragmatic philosophical approach? I think this to be not the case. One comes across number of instances where philosophers of those countries have moved to different directions even being critical to the empiricistic and pragmatic tendencies. For instance, Bradley could boldly attack the native philosophical school of empiricism. F.C. Schiller could move towards Protagorean humanism as against Socratic academic intellectualism. Cernap overtly advocated for Positivistic

basis of unity of science. It all shows that though empiricism has its origin in Britain, it has been pursued further by anybody irrespective of his nationality. There seems to be no necessary linkage between proper philosophic investigation and the issue of nationality. Even the Britishers who have opted for the so called nationalistic philosophic view have not done with a pre-conceived notion of commitment. They, I think, pursue that line of approach since they honestly feel that to be worthwhile from the rational point of view. It is not philosophical but purely extra-philosophical consideration which urges upon the individual to adopt a particular standpoint on the basis of national or cultural heritage.

But, all the same, it need not be suggested thereby that one should be blind to the national or cultural traits. One can, of course, quite meaningfully probe into its detailed structures and thereby one may be able to explore its logical as well as rational basis. But for that no presupposition be thought of as logically sacrosanct to the effect that philosophy in India or in any country whatsoever must be pursued on the basis of the country's national and cultural foundation with a view to merely support or oppose it. It is to be noted that simply boosting the existing cultural or national traits by means of philosophical justification would surely amount to some sort of uncritical dogmatism that is neither helpful for philosophic progress nor even to the proper evaluation of national or cultural framework. Any study of national culture or political ideology with a prior commitment of boosting it or even downgrading it only brings a propagandist flavour and is never conducive to an impartial and objective investigation. This need not suggest that there should not be any fruitful study so far as these issues are concerned. There may be a good theoretical investigation of the national and cultural basis of a particular race. A study of Indian nationality for that matter is obviously a laudable venture. A philosophical reading in the sense of analysing as well as evaluating various concepts used in national and cultural framework is ipso facto not unreasonable. But difficulty comes in when it is insisted that a philosophical study has to be nation or culture bound necessarily.

A philosopher is perennially engaged in analysing the various concepts used in different walks of human life. In Plato, for instance, is busy with the analysis of the concept of justice and so also the Samkara is absorbed in the analysis of the concept of sat (truth). Neither such analytical study of justice or 'sat' is found to have been limited to a particular nation or culture but is quite open in its formulation. Such type of concept cannot put the philosopher to be tied down to the interest of conceptual analysis undertaken by philosophers do have some impact on the worldly transaction in so far as such analysis brings some further illumination in the total human conceptual framework hitherto unattained. A social philosopher can profitably study the social concepts used in a particular arena and by way of analysis can reveal the interrelations or differences between different concepts used in that field. He may again recommend a conceptual review instead of merely describing the use of different concepts. But all such activities whether revisionary or descriptive can in one nation or one culture and so on. As by all such restrictions, philosophy ceases to function effectively losing its own autonomy.

But, nevertheless, I still feel that the Indian philosophers, at least in the traditional sense of the term, are engaged in



certain issues which have been developed in their distinctive intellectual tradition a parallel of what may not be located in the western philosophy. For example, one may take note of the discussion in the sphere of Indian epistemology about *pramana* and the concept of *miskama karma* in Indian ethics. Some such peculiar conceptual issues have been raised which require a different level analysis altogether and hence a kind blind imitation of foreign sources may surely put an obstruction. To explain the Indian conception of *dharma* in the line of religion is one such unwanted and incoherent move. In that way some of the distinctive conceptual issues found in traditional Indian philosophy have to be respected. In like manner certain socio-political concepts found in current Indian scene like *sarvodaya*, *charma-mirapeksata* and even *ahimsa* can also be surveyed taking their peculiar Indian roots into consideration. But this does not mean that Indian philosophy is to forgo its rational edifice and can accommodate any other extra-logical move in whatever manner it may be found as alluring. It may be granted that in certain sphere the analysis of modern socio-cultural concepts may be given prior importance as against the analysis of the old obsolete socio-cultural concepts; but this need not suggest that philosophical enquiry is to be detached from its reflective critical procedure and is to be tied down to some ideology in an illogical way.

Re-interpretation of the ancient Indian philosophical concepts and theories have been looked down under the assumption that it unnecessarily looks on the old antiquated ideas and does not contribute to progress and development. In this context special reference has been made to the study *Advaita*. It does not seem to be quite clear as to what is the rationale of such critical outlook. Does it imply that reinterpretation of classical texts or views is no philosophical interest; it is not worthwhile pursuing since it is not required in the present social context. Now, before making any estimation on the interpretation of *Advaita*, it may be pointed out that the relevancy of interpreting the old philosophical texts, etc. is not in any way lost at the event of the questions as posed above. First of all reinterpreting, reviewing, reappraising the old concepts or theories of any philosophical tradition need not at all be taken as unphilosophical. As a matter of fact, it is the distinguishing feature of philosophical activity that it always makes a review of the perennial issues and thereby becomes critical of the available theories with a view to be more enlightened about certain other conceptual distinctions, oddities which otherwise one would not have become able to notice. Such kind of philosophical activity mostly being carried in the manner of analysing various basic as well as non-basic concepts helps us in being further clear about the conceptual framework, which need not be thought as one closed static chamber or a finished product. That is the reason why in the western philosophical tradition reviewing the old philosophical theories has never been decried. If Plato could be reviewed by Ryle, St. Anselm's ontological argument could be revitalised by Malcolm then why should be there reluctance for reinterpreting Sankara's *Advaita* from fresh angle? This kind of review need not be taken as waste of labour. On the contrary, if taken in proper philosophical rigour, such kind reviewing seems to be quite important and relevant. However, it should be conceded that reviewing is a philosophical activity and it

need not be confined only to one type of philosophical trend of the past. It seems, there is already a move in this direction. Quite a good number of original reflective reappraisals of other philosophical views advocated by Sankhya, Nyaya etc. have already been done with fruitful result.

The fear that such type of review of the classical trend, in spite of its having philosophical significance, is not relevant at the present day social setting, does not also seem to be proper. Because if conceptual clarity is to be accepted as the objective of philosophising then it need not be thought *prima facie* that such kind of reinterpretation completely closes the door for all sorts of illumination at the conceptual plane. And it also need not be apprehended as it is made in many circles) that conceptual analysis, however encouraging it is in the theoretical sector, is not practically relevant. For instance, if a proper analysis of the term *dharma* is undertaken at the theoretical plane then much of the misgivings that encircle this concept would be withdrawn even at the present day social setting. At the practical level much of the confusions that are rooted in such misgivings can be easily avoided. As a result of which theoretical research becomes highly relevant at the practical sphere. The dichotomy between theory and practice need not be viewed so rigidly that there cannot be any conceivability of meeting ground between the two. So far as ancient philosophical writings are concerned, one can fruitfully concentrate on those type of works which may be of some significance for the purpose of exploring as well as analysing the linguistic, ethical, political and such other conceptual issues. Here one can meaningfully move for a philosophical appraisals of different concepts used in the *dharmaśāstra*, *nitiśāstra*, *arthaśāstra* and so on.

Doubts have been raised with regard to the nature of philosophising in terms of analysis. It has been opined in many circles that philosophising cannot simply consist in analysis. It has been pointed out that there are quite important recent philosophical trends like phenomenology and existentialism which are not analytical in their approach. In the event of all this, why should present day Indian philosophy be tied down to analysis? In this connection one often comes across such pungent remarks no one but the foolish can subject the poetry of the Upanishads to fruitless analytical scrutiny." 11 It is not quite clear as to what does the critic imply by analysis in this context. Is it suggested that analysis must be of one single type and only those philosophers who follow that single type are to be designated as analytical philosophers? But this suggestion leads into analysis an unnecessary and even misleading impression of essentialism which the majority of analytical philosophers have clearly indicated. If one looks into the trend of modern analytical philosophy which is rather present in more conspicuous manner in Anglo-Saxon countries, one can easily note that there is no such type of analysis which is the analysis and which is accepted by one and all. and yet there is no hesitance in labelling all the different philosophers under the common description "analytical" if their approaches are found to be resembling each other on some general scale. For instance, one can notice that Russell, Moore, Ayer, Wittgenstein, Strawson, Quine, Carnap and a host of others are undisputedly identified as analytical philosophers. But is it not the case that Russell is one of the sharpest critics of Moore's commonsense analysis, who is radically opposed to

Hylu's treatment of mind as a dogme of the ghost, Strauson is unwilling to accept the analysis of pain in terms of linguistic behaviourism as undertaken by Wittgenstein and Quine is very much against Cernep's positivistically inclined empiricism? It may be said here that the extension of the term 'analysis' to all these philosophers having so much different viewpoints is rather suggestive of vagueness. But such apprehension seems to be not well-grounded. For the main point that seems to have insisted upon so far as the analytic trend is concerned is to distinguish and discriminate different shades of meaning which ordinarily are not well-noticed. Philosophy, in order to place his point of view, is free enough to analyse the conceptual framework from any direction. That is why one finds within analytic movement different types like logical, linguistic, formal, structural and so on. But, despite all such differences, the common objective is somehow to seek due recognition of the autonomy of rational free thinking. It seems to be always aimed at a careful study and analysis of various arguments that are involved in building up a conceptual map. The whole investigation is taken in order to arrive at both validity and objectivity in the intellectual platform.

From this point of view if one makes a review of the whole situation, one may find that trends like phenomenology and existentialism are in the same rational plane and are bent upon directing the human mind to some such important areas in the conceptual map which otherwise one may not easily notice. How far the claims made by an existentialist or by a phenomenologist or even by a positivist ultimately stand is not here the issue. What is to be noted is that all these trends in the present century and other similar movements carried either in west or in east in their own sense do contribute to philosophic discussions provided they are designed to conceptual illumination of some sort and keep themselves removed from obscure mystical tendencies. For citing another illustration from the classical Indian source, it may be said that Vedanta has several forms of developments. A Samkhya and a Ramanuja are very much opposed to each other. But, even then, both of them seem to be committed to explain and establish their point of view by taking recourse to a common platform, i.e. *yukti*. It may be noted here that those who claim analytic tradition in Indian philosophy are not simply borrowing the technique from the west and forcibly graft it on the Indian ideas. On the contrary, it is argued that Indian philosophy is analytical on its own independent footing and in certain cases the analytic regard presented by classical Indian thinkers seem to be more profound in nature. There is nothing wrong in making an analytical appraisal of the ideas contained in Upanishadic poetry if they reveal certain philosophic significance. If there is philosophy of historical ideas or economic concepts why should there not be a critical and analytical study of the ideas of Upanishad? A negative attitude in this regard seems to be quite unconvincing.

It is curious that even appealing to such common point of view the classical Indian philosophers do not come to agreement; they continue to disagree. It is here an objection is raised. What, then, is the purpose of such rational discussion if ultimately no agreement is reached and the hair-splitting debates continue instead of solving the issue. Some have taken recourse to a point of withdrawal in form of advocating that the intellectual procedure of analysis of putting arguments and counter-arguments leads us to no positive end. Therefore such type of sterile debates are to be

discouraged. Philosophical activity being thus purely reduced to a sort of intellectual gymnastic gloss not have any fruitful service in the human context.

But the point to be noted here is that philosophy is to be judged within its own boundary or theoretical formulation. Why should one expect from a philosopher what one gets from say, a positive scientist or even a religious preacher? Each and every investigator should be given his freedom of operation, so that the very best can be expected from him within his own focus operandi. A philosopher, quite sincere to his rational investigation, plays his role admirably well if he undertakes his own business, i.e. reflecting, analysing different shades of ideas and concepts in order to find never and never subtleties in the realm of thought which otherwise are not noticed. This kind of activity with which philosophy has been perennially associated (be it west or east) contributes to theoretical clarity. It is not that conceptual confusions are only created by philosophers of the past and now are claimed to have been removed by the analysis. Had that been so, long since the philosophic enquiry might have been closed because of not having any relevancy at the concrete setting. Reflective discussions about the workings of concepts as such seem to be the work in which a philosopher is found to have been engaged all along and the results that are achieved so far need not be belittled. A negative attitude is encouraged only when one puts an altogether different scale as the standard to measure philosophic growth. The following remark made by A.J. Ayer seems to be worth considering.

"... the progress consists not in the disappearance of any of the age-old problems, nor in the increasing dominance of one or other of the conflicting sectors, but in a change in the fashion in which the problems are posed, and in an increasing measure of agreement concerning the character of their solution."

All this gives the clear indication that the progress in philosophy has to be judged in terms of rational and logical freshness that it offers from time to time and thereby further illumines our conceptual not-work which again need not be viewed as detrimental to the practical concern. Indian philosophy, as found today, does not of course present any single definite trend so that we can easily classify it as the so and so. But this need not be alarming. In the recent days Indian thinkers have definitely lotter scope in coming in contact with several types of reflective thinking. Unlike the pre-independent days, we all are today fortunate enough to be in touch with number of philosophical viewpoints that emerge under different situations. We are equally fortunate in having a rich philosophical tradition in which considerable amount of emphasis has been laid down on the free flow of reason. All these definitely guide us not to stick to one ism or the other in as irrational dogmatic procedure. One need not either move with a slogan that everything of inside is all perfect and self-sufficient or with the blind presupposition that everything of outside is all true and unmodifiable. It is the thoughtless, sweeping, generalised surmises that cause great difficulty for free exercise of intellectual investigation. Indian philosophers are to keep themselves open for all possible alternative approaches but at the same time they must be in a position to probe into various ideas and thoughts that are received from different sectors through the spirit of reflective and analytic vigour. Here analysis is not used in a narrower sense meaning thereby only linguistic or positivistic. It is used in a broader

perspective where maximum emphasis is given on the general flow of reason and valid argumentation. In that way Indian philosophers today are to continue on the same tradition in which their past predecessors have moved with great success. The rational discussions with a view to avoid unclarity and confusion and to pinpoint on further reflective areas which are yet unexplored and unexcavated are surely the most relevant ones in which the Indian philosopher must make himself preoccupied. He may, in this context, take note of peculiar socio-economic conditions prevalent in his country; he may again be watchful about the different national peculiarities while philosophising on certain political concepts. Those moves, as such, need not be disparaged. But the difficulty comes in when the philosopher forgets his own role in the rational reflective plane and twists the force of argument or reasoning to suit certain parochial national or racial motives, at the cost of proper analytic appraisal. In that way philosopher no longer analyses the political concepts but rather becomes a politician in the pejorative sense and thereby becomes very much removed from the philosophic track.

### Conclusion

So I conclude by saying that the prospect for Indian philosophy is quite encouraging. The present state of diverse tendencies in the philosophic discussions need not cause concern; it is rather helpful for a free flow of rational discourse. That is by both arguments and counter-arguments & rational conclusion (tattva) can be arrived at as well approved in the Indian philosophical tradition. The procedure that is more or less adopted or is going to be adopted in future years to come seems to be nothing but analytical and reflective. This analytic methodology should not be thought of as blindly echoing the foreign source. It is very much rooted in the Indian tradition of philosophising provided one is willing to take note of that. One regards the issues or the problems that are to be discussed in the philosophical context, I feel, that no such restriction is desirable. Freedom of philosophic enquiry is definitely hampered if one demands a philosopher to stick to certain particular ideology. He must be free enough to reflect and analyse any sort of ideas or concepts and can move for a rational scrutiny even if that is found to be unpalatable to certain committed ideologists. To construct a theory on some rational basis is itself not a matter of opposition; but one is to be watchful as to how far the reason that is employed in that context is logically tenable. Of course it should be noted that a free flow of reason does not demand that philosopher is to forget his human and social basis and can move on for such type of supra-intellectual or mystical contemplation that not only goes beyond human interests in the social plane but becomes ultimately detrimental to that. Philosopher, whenever he is, should not forget that he is first a man and then a philosopher.

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