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Ukraine war opened the pathway of the new cold war between the United States of America and Russia

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Abstract

The wave of the Russo-Ukraine war resulted in a meandering world order, which brought the balance of power to a new turning point. The new power tussle that arose between the U.S.A. and USSR shows their lingering ambition to create a unipolar world, which itself embedded in their histories. When World War II ended, the world was divided on the basis of ideology, i.e., the capitalist and the communist half. The USA and the latter led the former by the USSR. This results in unprecedented antagonism between the two, which is driven by dangerous proxy war, propaganda and surveillance, arms race, and state control terrorism known as the Cold War. The Russian-Ukrainian war, which befalls after eight years, again engineered a new method of hybrid war, which will be fiercer in the form of the New Cold War. The New Cold War brought turmoil and created an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty among the weak and insecure countries of the world. In this research paper, we will discuss the causes of the Russo-Ukraine war and its future effects in broad terms. It will also highlight the newer method of warfare that emerged in the course of the New Cold War. I also tried to explore how it will change the outlook of international relations. The New Cold War in Europe meant a new “War of Economics” in Asia and Africa. Nigeria is also gradually turning into a new site of the New Cold War. The new cold war that was engendered from the recent Russia-Ukraine war definitely, if not stopped, will spread its wings in the Transatlantic and Indo-Pacific region. This engulfed China, Japan, India, Israel, North Korea and all rising centres in the multipolar world. It is clearly giving an indication that somewhere; a new cold war is being born. Is the United States of America seeing Russia as a weak power due to the expansion of the NATO organisation in the Eastern part of Europe? Is America provoking Russia to opt for the war in order to weaken Russia? What course had Russia taken in the midst of the confrontation? All these themes will be the main focus of my research paper.

Keywords: Political supremacy, economic warfare, propaganda, international security, international organization, Crimea war, NTS architecture

Introduction

The ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine not only opened a door for a new Cold War but also brought a series of unseen dangers whose visibility lies in future. The Russian-Ukraine war is not merely a European crisis, but it reflects a multilayer and multiplayer geopolitical clash. To understand this changing global, we cannot study it alone in geopolitical terms; the geostrategic and geo-economics factors must be considered. As Halford Mackinder back in 1904 argued that ‘who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island; who rules the World-Island commands the world’. The transnationalism ^[1] and increasing globalization ^[2] had created a challenge to nation-states themselves. Further, it helped in the emergence of a multipolar world, which undermined the hegemony of the old power block USA and Russia. The artificial war that was created in Ukraine had been the melting point of the enviousness of the expanding technological and domestic development away from the power poles and also of the strategic competition between the USA and Russia. Russia finds a better peaceful way to undermine the hegemonic cosmopolitan world of the USA in both regional and international space, simply promoting emerging power centres like China and India. The polycentric world remained an important theme for Russian diplomacy since 2013. Russian Foreign Ministry stated in a press release in 2022;

Russia and India support the active building of a fairer, more equal and polycentric world order, realizing that it is unacceptable to *promote imperialistic dictate on the global arena* ^[3]. (Italic emphasis added)

Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in a video message to the participants in the 7th Young Diplomats Forum of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation countries, stated the following;

I have said many times that strengthening the new polycentric world order to make it more resilient, just and democratic has become a major trend. New global centres in Eurasia, the Asia-Pacific Region, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America core national interests and conducting an independent foreign policy ^[4].

Undoubtedly, Russia tried to carved a separate influential space in the emerging multipolar world. The Russia continuously tried to increase its influence in south East Asia by providing arms and energy ^[5]. After a few years of the gap after cold war Russia reasserted its power in African countries Sudan, Madagascar and the Central African Republic ^[6]. Interaction between Russia and Africa has grown exponentially this century, with trade and investment growing by 185% between 2005 to 2015 ^[7]. Further, the anxiety of power poles doubled by the fact that in 2060, GDP of India and China will account for 20–25% each of the world economy, and the sum of the OECD countries' combined GDP is predicted to account for approximately 40% of the world GDP ^[8]. Russia is at a good advantage as Xi is a junior partner and hardcore competitor of the USA. As a Rand Cooperation Researcher Stephanie Pezard argued Russia's mistrust predates the tensions borne out of the Ukraine crisis; instead, it is rooted in a perception of the current U.S.-led international order as denying Russia the place it deserves". Inasmuch to say that it is the expanding Putin "soft power arm" had caused much worry to Washington and needed to be cut down in order to make the USA only star in the sky.

The Pacific Ocean and Southeast Asia are the arenas for China's struggle against the United States and its partners, just as Eastern Europe and Euro-Asia are the arenas for Russia's struggle against the United States and its partners ^[9]. This made the "China question" more crucial as many Republican foreign policies stated that "the severity of the China problem means that even "if we have to leave Europe exposed, so be it. Asia is more important than Europe" ^[10]. Researchers have pointed out that America is using the war in Ukraine to encircle China ^[11] and contain it. Further, this attempt to reduce Russian and (Especially) Chinese influence over Western European markets while preventing the formation of a security axis and deepening economic relations between Berlin, Moscow and Beijing ^[12].

The layers of dilemmas and contradictions became visible in recent events in the Western world. The USA played an important role in European integration and dominated post-Cold war Europe. The European Union remained under the shadow of the United States, and the hegemony of the USA is well established in the region ^[13]. But the EU urged for an independent outlook as in 2019, the president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, formed a new "geopolitical Commission" and vowed to make the EU an independent actor in global affairs. She argued, "Will not be afraid to speak the language of confidence. But it will be our way, the European way" ^[11]. The increasing trade of Germany and other European countries and Russia. This undermines the USA strategic interest in the region. Also in Syria, Russia's military intervention kept the Bashar al-Assad regime in place and prevailed over US demands for change and wider Middle East, even stalwart US allies such as Israel and Saudi Arabia now consider Moscow as an

important power broker ^[14]. All these events are buzzing alarm for USA hegemony in the globe and Washington had to checkmate all at once.

Significance of the theme

The world, in the course of the Russian-Ukraine war, is moving towards the dead end of multilateral humanitarian relationships that exist among the nations. The war continuously created pockets of adversary block in the different parts of the world, which resulted in the further deepening of the "War Mentality." The statesman knew that the war not only caused destruction to the particular area, but it had impacts felt across the globe. Especially in the neo-globalized, the world is connected and deeply weaved with each other. Even the slightest turmoil borrough food crises, inflation, unemployment and so on.

While understanding the causes of this turmoil, we learn to avoid the crisis. The "war in history" taught us that development always lies in mutual cooperation and global partnership on issues that involve the cause of greater humanity rather than in global hegemony and realising chief political agendas. The role of world organisations like the United Nations became more crucial to bringing conflicting parties to mutual agreement and establishing peace in the world. The leadership of the future will have to comply with the rules of the consensual game, which translates into the ability to express clearly one's opinion, the power to know the opinions of others and the lucidity to make the final in a consensual way, starting from the "we decide together" principle ^[15].

Objectives of the Study

The objectives of the study are:

1. Examine historical relations between the United States of America and Russia
2. Emphasize the causes reflected in the Russo-Ukraine war after the disintegration of the USSR.
3. Study the nature and power exercise of NATO organization expansion in Eastern Europe
4. Discuss Russia's natural interest in Ukraine in the context of national Security
5. Analysis of the Russo-Ukraine War to open new challenges from international perspectives.

Research Methodology

The research is based on primary and secondary sources of information. The primary data resources have been collected from various governments and UN reports. Secondary sources of data were collected from books, articles, monographs and other literary sources. When writing an article, the method was used as a general scientific, fundamental method of security concern. Special research methods were also used, in particular, historical, concrete sociological, systemic, structural, and comparative legal concerns of the region of the USA, Russia and Ukraine. Research literature, which examines the ethical aspects of NTS can be divided into two groups. Basically, the war in Ukraine is all about the defence architecture of Europe and Russia's fears that the continued expansion of NATO, which began much before Crimea, threatens its security.

Historical Relation between the US and Russia: The two-power block and archrival of the Cold War era, the United States and Russia have a very critical, complex, multifaceted, and continuously changing relationship with

each other. Globalisation and emerging multipolar intensified the existing complexity. The course of their relationship can be considered the course of the global order and had a profound impact on international relations. To look into the complexity of their diplomatic relation, we must look back into the history.

The United Nations and Russia had been war allies in the 20th century to, which Erick Hobsbawm called “The Age of Extreme”. The two never fought a war against each other. Further, the USSR recognised the USA in 1803, and the USA also recognised the Bolshevik govt in Russia in 1917. The Americans and the West had reservations about the spread of communism. This eventually led to an ideological divide between the two after the Second World War and the emergence of the Cold War. The containment of communism and the Soviets became the prime concern of the USA after the establishment of Soviet satellite states in Eastern Europe. The USSR had its conservation about the USA because it was the sole nuclear power.

Further, the communist win in China and the Korean War decreased the trust between the two. The Marshall Plan aimed to contain communism as well as the Soviets. Subsequently, this led to the formation of NATO in 1949, the same year the Soviet Union had its first nuclear bomb and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance to organise the communist economic system accordingly. In the 50s, both engaged in armed races; the US tested its first hydrogen bomb in 1952 and the USSR in 1954. Following decades, the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s saw increased tension between the two. The major events that estranged the relationship between the two were the Cuban missile crisis, the Berlin War, the Vietnam War and so on. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Cold War ended with the retreat of Russia from Eastern Europe.

Their relationship moderated after the end of the Cold War but never came out of the shadow of the Cold War. The numerous pacts signed between the two on energy security, cyber security, collaboration on space missions, and a deal against terrorism. But the conflict between them continued to define their relationship, as we have seen in the case of war in Serbia, Georgia and Crimea. However, the recent Russian-Ukraine war had profound geopolitical implications as it opened a pathway to the new cold war between the United States of America and Russia.

Discussion and Debate

The recent Ukrainian war reveals the complexities, contradictions and power politics that emerged in the globalised world. The Ukraine war forces us to look at the multidimensionality of the global order, which many theorists and social scientists have ignored. The war in Ukraine is not simply “the war in Ukraine”; instead, it opens a pathway to a new cold between the U.S.A. and Russia. The Ukrainian War also represents the wider interest of the dominant power. U.S. allies in Europe and Asia do not just have a stake in favourable regional balances and U.S. dominance at sea—they have become critical to preserving both ^[16]. The new cold will give rise to more complex international relations. Turkey, however, even after being a NATO maintain good relation with Russia, even after Russian engagement in Ukraine War ^[17]. Similarly, it was easy for Israel to choose between the USA and Russia. Still, the present decision-making process regarding relations with China, Russia, and even the United States is more complex ^[10]. Russia is also looking to be a great power in

Eurasia and Asia rather than looking for dominance for great Europe, as in the previous century. Except for maintaining its influence unchallenged, it is considered a red zone.

Origin and Development of the Problems

Rise of Tension and Military Conflict

Modern military action between Russia and Ukraine can be traced back to 2014, when Ukraine’s political trajectory veered toward the West, away from the influence of Russia. The pro-Russian Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich was ousted during the Ukrainian revolution in response to this potential loss of power over Ukraine. Russia quickly invaded and illegally annexed Crimea, an aggressive move that garnered widespread condemnation from the international community. The war resulted from deep, contending tension beneath the surface between the old power block after the emergence of the multipolar world. The Ukrainian war shows global powers’ devious interest in achieving their covetous agenda.

Violence in Donetsk and Lugansk

These regions of Ukraine have been embroiled in a protracted separatist conflict. The background of the conflict is to grant these regions special status according to the “Minsk” accord ^[18]. But Zelensky denied the agreement, and Russia claimed that Ukraine tried to integrate these region’s forces, eventually returning to warfare ^[19]. These territories, which have significant separatist support, self-proclaimed as the Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic, have seen conflict stoked and supported by neighbouring Russia. The Russian government has supplied arms and logistical support to separatists in the region, as well as political and propagandistic encouragement for separatism to destabilize the area and increase Russian control and influence.

NATO and its clumsy policy in Eastern Europe

Even after the so-called post-Cold War era, NATO continued to create “artificial tension, “especially in Eastern Europe. NATO, along with the EU, constantly tried to assimilate countries in eastern Europe adjacent to Russia into its lobby to encircle Russia (see Map)




Fig 1: Image source-

<https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/defence-spending-pledges-by-nato-members-since-russia-invaded-ukraine/>

Further, NATO Eastern European countries, especially those adjacent to Russia, increased their defence expenditure compared to Western European countries.

Washington concluded that the EU alone was too weak to lead the enlargement process [20]. The pattern is clear. These eastern countries joined NATO rather than the EU. This led to further manifestation of the NATO and allied dream of a “Great and free Europe”.

European states did not join NATO because they wanted to be a part of the great system or to integrate a more liberal economy instead to appease the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, etc. [21]. Rebecca Moore argued that NATO adopts broader political role to bring stabilisation in the globe [22]. But the intent of NATO and the west never changed its fundamental aim to maintain its hegemony. As we can see, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline was a threat to the viability of Russia’s own Caspian pipeline, which ran across Chechnya and southern Russia to the Black Sea port of Novorossiysk [23]. As Ronald. D. Asmus argued, the “Enlargement of NATO was not the beginning of a new cold war” [20], but in fact “, it was, it is, and it will be”.

Ukraine Considers NATO Membership

Ukraine has been in informal cooperation and discussion with NATO since 1991. Until 2104, Russia had prioritized its relation with the U.S.A. and sought deeper cooperation with the West [18]. Rather than oppose Baltic membership to NATO, Russia actually helped it to happen by resolving border disputes with Lithuania [25]. However, Russia considered Ukraine as a red line for NATO. The closeness of Ukraine with the EU and its deep association with the

west led to illegal annexation of Crimea. It exacerbates Ukraine’s cooperation with NATO, though they did not formally apply for membership and have not joined the organization. Even without Ukraine’s official membership, it threw up a challenge to Russian sovereignty. The threat to Russian dominance in the region and Putin’s opposition appears to be rooted in a desire to curb Western influence in the region while reinforcing Russia’s geopolitical control.

Growth and Developments

The crisis escalated in February 2022 when Russia, after amassing troops along the border, initiated a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The increasing concern for energy security has profound implications for the new Cold War. The Ukraine may open the door for the U.S. and the West to the vast resources of central Eurasia and thus had geostrategic importance. For example, Kazakhstan had 12 per cent of world uranium, producing 28 per cent of world total uranium [26]. The Central Eurasia countries are important producers of natural resources.

President Biden urged to become energy independent while addressing people to support Ukraine. He said [27]:

Over the long term, as a matter of economic security and national security and for the survivability of the planet, we all need to move as quickly as possible to clean, renewable energy. And we’ll work together to help get that done so that the days of any nation being subject to the whims of a tyrant for its energy needs are over. They must end.




Fig 2: Data Source - Eurasia – Countries & Regions - IEA

In the new Cold War, there is a very new kind of war, the weaponisation of the US dollar and other Western currencies to punish their adversaries [28]. The US dollar is the most widely used currency for trade and other purposes, giving some hegemonic influence to the US. As President Biden said, “These economic sanctions are a new kind of economic statecraft with the power to inflict damage that rival’s military might. These international sanctions are sapping Russian strength, its ability to replenish its military,

and its ability to project power [27].” The number of Sanction imposed on Russia, including the ban on the Central Bank of Russia. The aim of U.S.A and West is devastated Russia economically and “make Russia a global economic pariah” [29]. The Atlantic Council showed that Industrial production in Russia plummeted after the sanctions imposed on Russia. Dec 2022 witnesses the sharpest year-over-year drop in industrial production in Russia.




Fig 3: Data source -Trading Economic, Russia Industrial Production - July 2023 Data - 2000-2022 Historical - August Forecast (tradingeconomics.com)

No doubt war and sanction affected the Russia economy but not such. However, the sanctions have not so much impact on Russia as it had been highlighted by the West. The Russian industrial production bounced back with significant growth with 6.5 per cent year-on-year in June 2023. While we look into the comparative data of weapon sales between U.S.A and Russia, it reveals a good rise in weapon production in the case of the U.S.A after the Ukrainian War compared to Russia.

This points toward the weapon industrialist lobby of the USA having benefitted more than any else. The artificial war, which continued creating havoc for humanity, is of interest to the industrialist bourgeoisie of the U.S.A. Further, Ukraine is verging on bankruptcy, and the cost of these weapons doubtless was borne by Washington and Brussels [30]. Ukraine gradually became the puppet of Washington with two masters, the EU and NATO.




Fig 4: Data Source- TradingEconomics.com




Fig 5: Data Source -TradingEconomics.com

However, his word highlighted to foster renewable energy but the concern over energy security is much visible. Russia and China joint cooperation with these countries caused much concerned among US and its allies. The Eurasian Times reported on 6 May “Russia has confirmed supplying highly enriched uranium to two Chinese nuclear reactors, prompting concerns about the deepening collaboration between the two nations in the nuclear energy sector”. The pentagon report pointed that China will triple its nuclear head by 2035. US National Security Adviser, Jake Sullivan, describing the cooperation as “a direct threat to US security” and calling on the Biden administration to take action to halt it ^[31].

The U.S.A hegemony over the world politics further challenge by emerging concept of de-dollarization all over the globe. In the upcoming BRICS summit in Johannesburg, Russian embassy there signaled the introduction of new currency backed by gold. We cannot escape the geopolitics of Baltic states since 1991, while looking into the Ukraine crisis. The Europeanization of the foreign policy of these states ^[32] and their increase alignment with EU and NATO had been concerned for Russia. The Ukrainian Crisis of 2014 occurred in shadow effect of Ukraine eagerness to collaborate EU on free trade and on other issues. Not only was the Association Agreement incompatible with Ukraine’s existing free-trade agreements with Russia, but there was also the Lisbon requirement for Ukraine to align its defense and security policy with the EU ^[33]. The former if not absolutely but partially motivated by the Baltic state policies leading to the annexation of Crimea by Russia. Again, the Ukraine craving to Europeanize its policies and its willingness to align with NATO leads to recent crisis. Volodymyr Zelenskyy failed to realize what Dmytro Firtash had said in May 2014 ^[34].

“This is a country that geographically and psychologically is a bridge between Europe, Russia and Asia. We should be a strong, independent, and neutral nation. We should be viewed as the ‘Switzerland of Eurasia’, allied with none, but friends and traders with all.”

Further, Geopolitical tensions are increasingly playing out in the technology and digital space, with impacts felt across geographic and sector ^[35]. The Ukraine war intensifies cyber war between U.S.A, China and Russia. Military cyber war

used to attack nuclear-production facilities, to hijack computers and servers for hostile purposes, to infiltrate networks with lurking malware awaiting timely activation, and to divert or prevent rocket launches by hostile powers ^[36]. The Netpolitic ^[37] had become deciding factor in the international relation, the enemy is next door ahead and more. This also used to create civil unrest, rebellion and finance terrorism activity. Russian a U.S complained that the Russian government had done nothing to curb the activity of Russian- based ransomware groups, nor had it halted intrusions by Russian security agencies into U.S. infrastructure or their disinformation efforts in U.S. social media ^[39].

Global Reactions and Consequences

Due to the aggressive motives and actions taken by Russia, many countries have found ways to support Ukraine and act against Russia on a global scale. From reducing international trade with Russia to seizing and freezing Russian nationals’ property in foreign countries, many countries worldwide have sanctioned Russia in response to its actions in Ukraine.

These countries include the US, Germany, the infamously neutral Switzerland, Poland, all G-7 countries, and many more. Beyond sanctioning Russia, many of these countries have also offered support to Ukraine by sending military and humanitarian aid, including millions of dollars’ worth of planes, tanks, intelligence-gathering equipment, and more. However, due largely to Putin’s many, thinly-veiled nuclear threats these countries have not stepped into direct combat, which would have been required by treaty if Ukraine were a member of NATO. The public reaction in Europe is also ambivalent. While Europeans are ready to stand behind Ukraine, they are less enthusiastic about paying the financial costs of deterring Russia ^[40]. EU itself had some moral binding as China and Russia had also dispatched healthcare resources to the worst-hit parts of the EU as a humanitarian gesture ^[35] during Covid 19 Pandemic.

Economic Impacts of the Russo-Ukraine War

Economic instability arose due to Ukraine and Russia, which was further exuberated by Russian disinvestment and had significant financial impacts on the global economy.

Before the war, Ukraine, though a relatively small country, was among the world's top three grain exporters, a natural resource motivating Russia's desire to control. Ukraine's importance in agriculture has earned it the nickname "the Breadbasket of Europe." However, Russia has severely obstructed Ukraine's ability to manufacture and export grain, especially in the black sea region [41].

At the same time, before the current war, Russia supplied 45% of total gas imports in Europe and was the largest supplier of petroleum products. The hindrance to Russian exports is that many countries have been forced to find new sources of natural gas, oil, and petroleum products, which has driven prices upward. The EU people had to face blunter than Americans. After the invasion, oil, coal and gas prices increased by around 40%, 130% and 180%, respectively [42]. This results in Food prices rising by 14.1% in January 2023 compared with one year previously [43]. The inflation, which is 2.89 in 2021, stands at 6.9 in 2023 [44]. 8 The inaccessibility of Ukraine's critical food products and the active rejection of Russia's cheap gas, has led to significantly increased prices worldwide for grain and gas, two essential components of the global economy. This has co-occurred as record inflation, and each has worsened the other.

Current Humanitarian Crisis

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

(UNHCR) has estimated that the ongoing crisis has produced more than 5 million refugees from Ukraine, while 17 million people need urgent humanitarian assistance [45]. While this conflict has had many global economic and political consequences, the most significant results are those felt by the citizens facing war violence. Critical infrastructure has been damaged and destroyed, limiting Ukrainian citizens' access to transportation, healthcare, and other essential services. In December 2022, the World Bank estimate put the likely cost of reconstruction at up to \$641 billion [46]. Nonprofits such as the Ukraine Assistance Organization are committed and fearless in supporting the most remote and isolated communities, but even more excellent support is needed.

What are Russia's broad interests in Ukraine?

Russia has deep historical, cultural, economic, and political bonds with Ukraine. During the crisis in 17th century Russia, many peasants fled away. They settled in lands of Siberia in the east of Ukraine, standing between Russia, Poland-Lithuania, and a Tatar state on the Crimean Peninsula—the word Ukraine itself means "border region" [47]. Zbigniew Brzezinski argued Without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be a Eurasian empire. Russia, without Ukraine, can still strive for imperial status. Still, it would become a predominantly Asian imperial state, more likely to be drawn into debilitating conflicts with aroused Central Asians [48].



Fig 6: Map Sources: Why-Ukraine; Source <https://www.nato.int/nato-on-the-map>

The above map elaborates on the linguistic strategic importance of Ukraine to Russia. The southern and eastern Ukraine had a Russian linguistic population, which Russia considered as its heritage. The annexation of Crimea to Russia was done in order to unite the Russian ethnicity in Crimea with Russia. In the ongoing war, Russia occupied the Russian majoritarian territory of Ukraine. Secondly, the

Russian gas and oil pipeline goes through Ukraine. If Ukraine joined NATO, it would undermine Russian national interest in multiway. That's why Ukraine is central to Russia's identity and vision for itself in the world.

Historical and Geographical ties

Russia and Ukraine have deep bonds that go back centuries.

Kyiv was considered as first political centre by the Russian People, that's why Kyiv, the capital city of Ukraine, is sometimes referred to as "the mother of Russian cities," on par in terms of cultural influence with Moscow and St. Petersburg. It was in Kyiv in the eighth and ninth centuries that Christianity was brought from Byzantium to the Slavic peoples. It was Christianity that served as the anchor for Kievan Rus, the early Slavic state from which modern Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians draw their lineage. Still today, Putin and Russian leaders believe that Russians and Ukrainians are "odyn narod" (one people), which necessitates they live in one union or within a common cultural space such as that defined by the "Russkii Mir" [49]. In geographical terms, the Dnieper River has historical significance, which connects Belarusian and Russian cities in the north with the Black Sea in the south, and from there beyond to the straits of the Bosphorus, which connect to the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas [50].

Russian diaspora

According to the 2001 census, around eight million ethnic Russians were living in Ukraine, mainly occupying the region of south and east Ukraine, constituting 17.3 per cent of the total population. At the April 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest, Putin told the NATO Russian council that Ukraine was an artificial state and that "seventeen million Russians" lived in eastern and southern Ukraine [49]. The Kremlin considered its duty to protect the rights of these people, and on this pretext, it took armed actions in Crimea and the Donbas in the year 2014.

Echoing Superpower

After the Soviet collapse, many Russian politicians viewed the divorce from Ukraine as a mistake of history and a threat to Russia's standing as a great power. Losing a permanent hold on Ukraine and letting it fall into the Western orbit would be seen by many as a significant blow to Russia's international prestige. Moscow regains control over Ukraine, with its 52 million people, major resources, and access to the Black Sea; Russia automatically again regains the money to become a powerful imperial state, spanning Europe and Asia [51]. Under these facets, Russia escalates the war against Ukraine, claiming that the USA and West are threatening Russian multilayer interests to destroy Russia and its hegemony in the region.

Crimea Region

Nikita Khrushchev transferred Crimea from Russia to Ukraine in 1954 as "noble act on the part of the Russian people" to commemorate the 300th anniversary of the "reunification of Ukraine with Russia" (a reference to the Treaty of Pereyaslav signed in 1654 by representatives of the Ukrainian Cossack Hetmanate and Tsar Aleksei I of Muscovy) and to "evinced the boundless trust and love the Russian people feel toward the Ukrainian people" [52]. Crimea had 75 per cent ethnic Russian. After the independence of Ukraine, many Russian nationalists in Crimea had a desire to unite with Russia. Further, Crimea had its own strategic importance for Russia from maritime and military point of view.

Trade and Commerce

Ukraine for Russia one of the top trade partners from a long time but their trade relation lessens due to geopolitical clashes and increasing tie between Moscow and Beijing. But

the importance of Ukraine in terms of trade also not diminish even slightly. In 2021, Ukraine exported \$3.61B to Russia. The main products that Ukraine exported to Russia are Aluminum Oxide (\$613M), Hot-Rolled Iron (\$353M), and Flat Flat-Rolled Steel (\$131M). During the last 25 years the exports of Ukraine to Russia have decreased at an annualized rate of 1.78%, from \$5.65B in 1996 to \$3.61B in 2021. In 2020, Ukraine exported services to Russia worth \$2.62B, with Transportation (\$2.43B), Other business services (\$89.6M), and Royalties and license fees (\$42.9M) being the largest in terms of value [53]. The table below provide the trade graph between Russia Ukraine. The graph shows deep commercial interest Russia from many years intended to create unified market system Eurasia.

Ukraine Exports to Russia 2022	Value
Inorganic chemicals, precious metal compound, isotope	\$142.24 M
Iron and steel	\$127.65 M
Machinery, nuclear reactors, boilers	\$63.09 M
Plastics	\$27.46 M
Articles of iron or steel	\$13.68 M
Electrical, electronic equipment	\$12.65 M
Vehicles other than railway, tramway	\$9.37 M

Data Source: Tradingeconomic.com.

Resources and Energy Infrastructure

Ukraine is rich in mineral resources. Ukraine had 170 mostly used minerals out of 170 minerals. As of 2019, known Ukrainian reserves amounted to 1.09 trillion cubic meters of natural gas, which is the second biggest reserve in Europe [54]. Secondly, Moscow had an energy infrastructure, i.e., a gas pipeline in Ukraine through which it supplied gas to nations in Central and Eastern Europe for decades, and it paid Kyiv a handsome amount of transit fees.

Political Oscillation

Since Russia granted independence to Ukraine, Russia has always tried to hold its political influence in Ukraine. The earlier Ukraine president also didn't look beyond the Russian lens while maintaining its independent status. One Ukrainian president said, "When there's frost in Russia on Thursday, by Friday, there's frost in Kiev" [47]. However, the scenario changed after the Europeanization of Baltic states and the spreading influence of Western democratic values and culture, which put a question mark on the traditional style of authority that continued to be exercised by the states, resulting in several colour revolutions in the region. Ukrainian pro-Russian president Viktor Yanukovich lost the favor of the public, resulting in the Orange Revolution, a popular movement. The shock to Russia was further exacerbated by the similar electoral revolution in Georgia in 2003, known as the Rose Revolution, which was followed by another revolution in Kyrgyzstan known as the Tulip Revolution. Despite this political upheaval, the Kremlin did not lose its sphere of influence. Further, following the open market economy it focuses much on economic integration.

The Findings of the Research

The new Cold War shows a newer trend among power blocks engaging in hostilities; instead, in direct confrontation, the great power in the great game either searches or creates a "Marionette" country to act against the enemy. The marionette country symbolizes the hegemony of

the master in global politics, or it was used to weaken, villainize or distract the enemy from the global affair and to expand its hegemonic wings in the multipolar world. The new battle is fought on non-traditionalist lines in newer spaces like cyber war, creating separatist tendencies in the rival country, weaponization of finance, the propaganda of morality and emotive pressure through social media, human rights, terrorism, and environment protection. The ongoing Ukrainian war shows all these emerging ways of warfare among big players.

Since the Cold War era, America has always been concerned with Eurasian countries, and it tried to establish itself as the determiner of regional politics. Further, in fact, Ukraine for the U.S.A and the west, is a gateway for Eurasia. The Ukraine War reveals the intent of the U.S.A. to deter the expanding multipolar centre like China and India. Russia promoted the vision of a multipolar world, where international law helps to safeguard the interests of sovereign states without the room for a self-proclaimed global leader with special privileges in the international system^[19].

Concluding Remarks

The Russian-Ukraine War opened the way for a new Cold War. The stakeholder in the new Cold War, whether it was Russia or the USA, was concerned with multilayer strategic interests all over the globe. They are no longer concerned with grouping to become a military might; instead, they are on the hunt for countries that have energy sources, chief labour land and minerals. The USA's interference in Afghanistan was not a "war against terror" but for important minerals like lithium. Like Afghanistan, Ukraine will be left cripple by the USA; The UN has failed to look at such a crucial issue that in the name of establishing democracy, the power player exploits this country. The war in Ukraine also shows that NATO and its allies tried to diminish the image of Russia in the eyes of Asia and South East Asia, as Russia had considerable historical influence in the region. Further, the USA, through NATO, tried to create its global hegemony. From time to time, it tried to suppress emerging soft powers like India playing friendship politics between Islamic nations and India. Further, the Ukrainian war shows that NATO is no longer rigidly united. The conflicting interest of the West with the USA reveals its weakness, as we see the brunt of inflation faced by the West, not by Europe, because of energy dependence on Russia. However, despite the USA continuously provoking Russia towards the war so that it can make itself firm in the Arctic, Transatlantic and Indo-Pacific. The geopolitical chessboard, as Zbigniew Brzezinski called it, the USA played the "Danish Gambit"; even without sacrificing the Ukrainian pawn, it realises its multifaceted agenda. By using war in Ukraine, it holds its tight claws over the EU, and through this artificial war, it obstructed the market economy of Russia and China in Europe.

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