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## The Unpredictable relations of India and Pakistan

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### Abstract

The present work is a thorough study of the relations of two rivalry nations –India and Pakistan. These two countries are the close neighbors’ of each other. The relationship between these two countries are always off and on. Both the countries share same culture same festivals same ethics however between the two countries KASHMIR is the bone of contention. Pakistan says Kashmir is our jugular vein and India says Kashmir is just like head of our body. This work concludes that if both the countries work together for the eradication of poverty there will be no person left without food and both the countries should shun their difference so that peace may prevail in central Asia.

**Keywords:** CBMs, doctrine, Versatility, Nuclear ammunition, Strategic relations, Mutual assured destruction

### Introduction

Though it has been a longtime since 1947, both Pakistan and India couldn’t steer the trajectory of their relations in the right direction. Even in the twenty first Century, this relationship is, by and large, determined through the prism of history. The nuclearization of South Asia, triggered by India and the strategic arms race alongside perpetual state of conflict, have aggravated the threat of war that may no more remain limited or restricted to convectional arsenal; but has strong indicators of escalation of any future conflict to nuclear plane, leading to Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD.) Amin M. Shahid, 2000 <sup>[1]</sup>. The assumption that economic interdependence can lead to normalization of relations, has failed in this particular case. According to Benerjee, Dipankar, 2000 <sup>[3]</sup> determinants and dynamics of bilateral relations, holdout that normalization of relations is a complex phenomenon intricately embedded in the resolution of the core disputes. Be it the domain of military and strategic relationship, or either political or economic dimension, there has been no substantial improvement. The resolution of the core disputes including Kashmir is the key to the betterment of relations, which remains as an unfulfilled agenda in the United Nations.

Pakistan-India relations are determined by the history of mistrust, ideological differences, and perpetual conflicts (Benjamin, Joseph, 2004) <sup>[4]</sup>. The strained political and strategic relations have overshadowed the benefits of cooperation in every aspect of relations. A positive and result-oriented engagement between the two states has been missing since inception. Potential of economic cooperation remained untapped whereas broad-based development of the two people also suffered.

Ironically, in the list of largest arms importers, India and Pakistan rank at number one and seven respectively, whereas both lie at lowest rungs with regards to human development and poverty reduction Kamath, P.M., *India-Pakistan Relations*, 2005. Both countries are suffering from internal instability; Pakistan is engaged in military operation against militancy in FATA, India is facing many separatist movements in its North-Eastern States. Kashmir is a disputed territory and a core conflict between India and Pakistan (*New Encyclopedia*, Vol. 27, London, 2002). At the time of partition of the Sub-Continent, the Muslim majority state of Kashmir was annexed by India with the connivance of departing British entities and individuals, like the Chairman Boundary Commission and the first Governor General of India. The United Nations had declared it as disputed territory way back in 1948, and the status is unchanged. The other unresolved territorial issues include water, Sir Creek and Siachen.

Since Partition in 1947, the mistrust and hostility in the backdrop of these issues, have only aggravated, resulting in three full scale wars between the two states, leading to the nuclearization of South Asia St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1995 <sup>[18]</sup>. The relations in twenty

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first century, by and large, remain under the shadow of history. Though, nuclear deterrence has minimized the possibility of full scale war, it could not prevent the two states from indulging into low intensity crisis.<sup>8</sup> In the emerging scenario, India has started terming Pakistan as the supporter of terrorism; often accusing it of sponsoring terrorist activities in India; while Pakistan names India for meddling by its Intelligence agency to destabilize Pakistan. Though political and diplomatic efforts to normalize relations have continued albeit with interruptions, these have, by and large, remained inconclusive. The urge for improvement of economic relations has been stressed from both sides and there has been gradual increase in the trade volume, Sage Publications, New Delhi, 2008. Some strategists argue that enhanced economic cooperation could contribute towards decrease in political tensions. However, India-Pakistan present a complicated case, where this notion may not hold ground. The history of relations illustrate that economic relations have not lessened the political rivalry but the latter has deteriorated or disrupted the economic activities. Though a number of Track-II initiatives are functional, any worthwhile progress is not visible.

#### **Determining factors in India-Pakistan relations**

The relations between India and Pakistan can largely be determined by the history, ideology, culture and geography. The history of animosity dates back to the inception of very idea of partition on the basis of discriminatory treatment of Muslim minority by the Hindu majority; foundation of Muslim League to protect the rights of the Muslims which Indian National Congress — a Hindu dominated party had failed to address (Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2011).

**Roots of Animosity:** Living together through centuries, both communities developed some similarities in food, culture and lifestyles but within these domains, there remained defining dissimilarities that had always been contentious between the two communities from united to divided India (Foundation Books, Delhi, 2009) <sup>[16]</sup>. They don't even share the same narrative of history; each side has its own heroes and villains, which are conflicting i.e. heroes of one community are villains of the other community and vice versa. Even though living together for centuries, the integration between the two communities remained untenable — at best limited to patchy convergences. Hindi was considered the language of Hindus and Urdu 'was branded as the language of Muslims'. Ideological differences deepened the hatred Demand for a separate homeland for Muslims became inevitable in the wake of ruthless Congress rule in 1937 and the consequent efforts to implement Hindu hegemony over minorities. Hence, the — two nation theory became the ideological foundation for the partition, Foreseeing the marginalization of Muslims and continuous conflict between the two communities, Muslim leadership demanded a separate homeland for Muslims as part of decolonization process for Indian sub-Continent — a country consisting of Muslim majority areas of India. Hindu dominated political party Congress was not in favor of the creation of Pakistan; it wanted to rule entire India (Akhand Bharat) which was once ruled by Muslims before colonization by the United Kingdom.

#### **Relevance of the study**

It is well documented that in contrast to India, Pakistan started its journey as an independent state without the political infrastructure around which democracy could grow and develop. This institutional deficit created the space for the early rise of the military as an autonomous and powerful actor in domestic politics in Pakistan but in India, civil authority is supreme.

Therefore if democracy succeeds in Pakistan then peaceful environment can be harvested in South Asia. India is very much alive to this and has made considerable efforts in this direction and wanting a stable neighbor at peace with itself. Yet, the Indian Strategy has not been able to translate the intent into reality. <sup>16</sup> There is no doubt that people on both sides want contact, not distance. In 2006, the year of writing, it had to be seen to be believed. A huge number of people gathered at the same border nearly 500,000 people had only one slogan on their lips: 'Hindustan. Pakistan Dosti Zindabad' (long live India-Pakistan friendship'). This shows that people of both states want always live together, then why government of both states cannot engage for permanent peace of the subcontinent (Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2013).

**Third Party Factor:** Bilateralism in Indo-Pak relations remains the fundamental principle of conflict resolution initiatives. The 1972 Simla agreement signed following the 1971 war provided that both parties will settle their pending disputes through bilateral negotiations or through any other means mutually agreed upon between them. This agreement ruled out the possibility of any third party involvement in Indo-Pakistan affairs, especially on the disputes which are being negotiated within the rubric of the eight baskets mechanism. But here is not to deny the influence of the third party indirect influence, particularly the United States, in Indo-Pak relations. In the 1990s, after the withdrawal of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan, there was a discernible plunge in US interest in Pakistan on the one hand and growing warmth in relations with India on the other. Such a paradigm shift in US foreign policy added to Pakistan's insecurity, driving it to establish a mechanism for engagement with India to address its security interests, independent of US support (Singh, Harnaikh, and Tridivesh Singh Mani 2008). The need for Pakistan to engage India in dialogue continues today. Likewise, the rapprochement with China with both sides bolstering their trade relations and engaging in talks to resolve their boundary disputes indicated India's increasing control over its foreign relations with neighbors, who also had good relations with Pakistan. As a result Pakistan was slowly coming to terms with the new realities in which, like India and China, it needed to move away from a confrontationist approach towards a policy of engagement and address pending disputes in a peaceful and negotiated manner. The conventional wisdom that one cannot choose neighbours and therefore must learn to live with them had begun to shape India and Pakistan's foreign policy formulations, irrespective of the challenges and difficulties such an approach entailed.

**Review of the literature:** There are number of books and articles on India and Pakistan most of it has become history specially in the context of the changed world scenario but this literature cannot be ignored as international relations do not exist in vacuum, they are based on history, legacy,

changing environment etc. Thus this literature helped in understanding the background of their relations and the factors contributing to tensions and development on the bilateral front. Jivanta Schottli and Seigfried O. Wolf in their book, *State and Foreign policy in South Asia* works brilliantly and describes rich theoretical insights, with first rate empirical analysis and bold academic arguments which would not only be useful for students of South Asian international Politics but also policy makers of the region. However the book also suffers from the number of shortcomings. Kalim Bhadur in his article, *Pakistan, India's Neighbor: so near, but so far* describe India-Pakistan relations in historical perspective. He talks how India-Pakistan became separate from the two nation theory. He also talks that how disputes begins between these two countries since their formation. These disputes today seem endless. He also talks that why Pakistan Joined the South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) instead of joining the nonaligned group. He also describe that why Pakistan's foreign policy is India centric in every respect and how Pakistan give more priority to Kashmir issues and how Pakistan inspired by China's success in war against India in 1962 and start war against India in 1965. He also talks about the formation of Bangladesh and India's role in it. He also describes the different steps taken by the government of India and government of Pakistan to improve their relationship in different phases. He also talks about the use of SAARC and benefits of the SAFTA (South Asian Free Trade Agreement) to resolve dispute between India and Pakistan. Latha A Pandit in his article, *India and her Neighbours changing perceptions*, talks about foreign policy towards her neighbour country and describes that why India should give highest priority to her neighbours in her foreign policy. He also talks that how India's neighbour policy changes under different government since 1947. He also describes the major issues and concern of India with her neighbor countries like Pakistan, Bangladesh, Srilanka, Nepal, Afghanistan, Bhutan and Maldives. T.V Paul in his works *South Asia's Weak States: Understanding the Regional Insecurity Predicament* gives a rich scholarly literature on weak/failed states in regions outside the African continent is a welcome addition. The principal aim of the book is to assess the perennial insecurity, both domestic and regional within South Asia. Paul contends that South Asia's multifaceted insecurity predicament can be explicated by two important factors - the presence of weak states and weak cooperative interstate norms. This book has a fair mix of the theoretical and empirical. It devotes substantial space to both, the conceptual analysis of state weakness and regional insecurity in South Asia, and individual country case studies. It is well researched and well argued, and is a valuable contribution to the growing body of scholar literature on failed/weak states and South Asian security. It will be of much interest to scholars, policy analysts and students. R.S. Yadav in his article *Changing contours of India's Neighbourhood Policy*, talks about the India's foreign policy towards her neighbours like SAARC, ASEAN, BIMSTEC, and East Asian nations etc. He also describes that how China and Pakistan are India's core neighbours and what are the basic reasons behind their complexity of bilateral and regional ties between India and these states. He divided India's neighbour policy in five phases like

- (i) Nehruvian Idealism
- (ii) Indira Gandhi's Real Politik
- (iii) Policy of Adhocism
- (iv) Gujral Doctrine and
- (v) Look East policy to extended neighbour hood.

He also explain that how India's foreign policy change from NAM, Panchsheel to Look East policy and from there now a day's why India extended her neighbour policy towards trade, energy, security and strategic issues from political and Economic issues. Mohor Chakraborty in his article *India and Pakistan: Chasing the Horizon of concord and discord* deals with the present milieu between India-Pakistan. He describes that how India start talks with Pakistan from the platform of cricket after 2008. How the cricket world cup 2011 match of India and Pakistan became a platform of talks between the prime minister of the both the country. He also deals with the different issues from where both the country can take benefits and move ahead and set a solid platform for peace process. These issues are related to prisoners, diplomatic encounters or issues related to sanitation in South Asia, increase visiting period across LOC for the people of Kashmir etc. He also deals with issues of lack of agreement between these countries. These issues are terrorism, nuclear energy, hydropower dispute where India and Pakistan are unable to set a good platform. The assassination of Osama Bin Laden is also affected the peace process talks of these countries. But also tells that both the nations go ahead for talks to peace process. David Malone tries to express the symbol of modern India but the imagery of the dancing elephant has been used in other contexts as well. The work, he notes, is not based on theoretical framework but is historical and empirical in its roots and enquiring in its aims. It also describe three distinct periods of Indian foreign policy. It also tells that Pakistan has been the major factor in Indian foreign policy. India's relationship with Pakistan is a challenging area for western scholars but also one where they are ever willing to enter in search of the magic bullet. He tells that terrorism is the main concern for India, Kashmir for Pakistan and nuclear proliferation for the rest of the world. Priyanka Singh in her work *Militant Training Camps in Pakistan – Occupied Kashmir: An Existential Threat and analyzed the situation in POK (Pakistan Occupied Kashmir)* and describes how different terrorist groups like Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), Hizbul Mujahideen, Jamat-ud-Dawa (JuD), Al Qaeda and etc poses threat. She also describes how these terrorist groups running different training camps in the regions like POK and NWFP (North West Frontier Province). She explain that these terrorist camps recruit women cadres to disturb the security in the region. She concluded that the poverty, unemployment, illiteracy and absence the socio - economic development, misguided the people in the region.

### Methodology

In this research work, the historical - analytical and comparative method is used. The problem is evaluated in a holistic manner by using all the dimensions relating to the issues. The data has been collected from different sources. But the study mainly depends on secondary source. Primary sources also has been used for support like, foreign affairs records, annual reports, government documents, statement and speeches of various leaders of both states etc. has been consulted. All the secondary sources available in the form of



books and articles published in various journals, newspapers, magazines and internet services has been used. The research methods used for the study have been descriptive and analytical. For this purpose both primary sources and secondary sources have been used. Primary sources included India-Pakistan Document Reports, Charters/Declarations, Joint Press Releases, Foreign Affairs Records, Annual Reports, Statements by Indian or Foreign Leaders/Ministers and unpublished materials, etc. This paper is concerned with the issue of India-Pakistan's bilateral relations and has been divided into following chapters:

1. Introductory
2. Political Relations
3. Strategic Dimension
4. Economic Relations
5. Cultural Relations
6. Conclusion

### **Political relations**

India's image among its neighbors is not at all sober in nature and its relations are not smooth in its entirety. There is perhaps no other bilateral relationship which has attracted such intense global scrutiny for over six decades as the India-Pakistan relationship. The relations between India and Pakistan always determine the situation of tranquility in the South Asian region. In this case of India and Pakistan, given the historical divide between Hindus and Muslims, it is understandable for a certain amount of acrimony and distrust to have an impact on their relationship. This resulting quarrelsome mindset has prompted three wars so far, which have resulted in both the countries diverting huge and precious financial resources to defense unfortunately. 1 The reasons for such an interest, which often encouraged direct and indirect interference by various powers, are not difficult to identify. The relationship, for one has been, acrimonious, and also viciously violent, causing death and destruction of several thousand people in four military conflicts and has potential of bringing the world to perhaps its first nuclear confrontation. 2 Pakistan's obsession with India began when the subcontinent got independence in 1947. The partition of the subcontinent into India and Pakistan came with a record brutal violence, deaths, and damage after the All India Muslim League (AIML) declared on the Direct Action Day (DAD) on August 16, 1946, to divide India or destroy India. At the time of the partition the world's worst migration of people, who cross borders in Punjab and Bengal, was more than ten million and genocide of communal carnage of almost one million in the subcontinent. The demand for Pakistan was not an ideological revolution but an extremism to set up a new land for Islamists that stoked and fomented communal hatred and bloodshed. The Hindu and Muslim who revolted together in 1857 against the British were killing each other in the 1940s. At the time of partition the rulers of the nearly 500 odd princely states that were directly under the British were advised to join either India or Pakistan, keeping in mind proximity, their demographic profile and other factors. Most states were integrated into either India or Pakistan. However there were a couple of states that had a problem. Hyderabad (Deccan), which was ruled by a Muslim Nizam, had a large, mainly Hindu Population, but geographically it was completely surrounded by India. Likewise the state of J & K had a Hindu Maharaja, but the majority of its population

were Muslim and, unlike Hyderabad, both India and Pakistan had contiguous borders with it. While both these states set on the fence for quite a while before opting for India or Pakistan, the issue of Hyderabad was settled by a short and swift police action that resulted in its merger with India. J & K was attacked by a large number of tribesmen supported by regular Pakistani troops in 1947-48, while there ruler set on the fence. When Pakistani regulars and tribesmen were within gunshot of Srinagar, he sought India's assistance in exchange for acceding to it. Subsequent event resulted in a ceasefire that over the years and despite two and a half wars has more or less remained in place. One part of the west and north is under Pakistani control and eastern part including the valley, is under India's control. The divider is called the Line of Control (LOC), which was delineated soon after the Simla Agreement was concluded in 1972. Pakistan's attempt to integrate the erstwhile state of J & K by force in 1947, 1965, and 1999 failed each time, and has left the issue unresolved to this day. It is the primary cause for conflicts between the two countries.

### **Strategic relations**

The South Asia has major strategic importance in the world due to rise of India and Pakistan as nuclear power in 1998 and these nations have a large volume of rising middle class in their respective regions. South Asia has come full circle in its political place in the sun by 1980 and in our understanding of its strategic environment. When the British ruled the subcontinent they recognized three areas of external threat like the northeast region, the northwest region and the Indian Ocean. But after independence India rejected the kind of geostrategic logic which was developed by the British. After independence, Nehru sought to deflect India's important neighbors with good-will; while Pakistani leaders proclaimed their support of the 'great game' their concerns were primarily against India. The tragic and unnecessary misdirection of India and Pakistan stood these nations against each other. A number of factors rest upon the boundary between region and the broader international system. These are by far of greatest importance to outsiders worried about India and Pakistan's relationship to the 'arc of crisis' although not necessarily with in India. Indeed China supports Pakistan with weapons propaganda and possibly nuclear technology and the US supports China economically, but in both cases it is India that must face the unintended consequences. Of course, Indians argue that India is the target of a so-called US-China-Pakistan axis, but one need not subscribe to this view to reach the conclusion that the actual effect is nearly as bad, from an Indian perspective. The former president of Pakistan Zia Ul Haq was very much interested to restore normal relations with India. Further it must be recognized that a weak Pakistan is no less a threat to India than a strong Pakistan, many Indians are coming to acknowledge this point. There are areas where the major outside economic powers can make useful contributions to regional stability. There are a number of joint river and water projects that could be pursued by India and one more of its neighbors. There is room for expansion informational and educational programs. Pakistan political fate will also shape the regional order. If the country continues down its present pathway of violent internal discord, political turmoil, and institutional collapse, it may emerge as a greater challenge to India than the one that it currently poses. A nuclear armed neighbor and adversary

facing institutional collapse can pose security challenges on an unimaginable scale because of question related to the safety and security of its nuclear arsenal. Even if the dire issues of the safety and security of its nuclear arsenal do not rise, a steady erosion of the Pakistani state may lead to the flight of refugees across a porous, if highly militarized, international border. Such population could be transfers could be very serious demographic challenges for India and not merely in terms of sheer numbers. Instead, they could well provoke ethno religious tensions (Hindu vs. Muslim) in extremely fraught Border States that have had a history of ethno religious discord and violence. On the other hand, if democratic consolidation with Pakistan proves viable, the country may at long last be able to shed the embrace of periodic military rule. In turn, the emergence of a consolidated democratic regime may lead to the beginnings of a political rapprochement with India, thereby steadily easing the long-standing hostility and competition that has characterized the relationship.

India is risk-averse was amply demonstrated by India's refusal to take actions against Pakistan after the 13 December 2001 terrorist attacks on the Indian Parliament by terror groups operating from Pakistani territory. India responded to this event with the largest military mobilization in its history. However, being risk-averse owing to uncertainty about its operational successes, as well as the presence of nuclear weapons, India did not launch military actions against Pakistan.

Additionally in the wake of the most audacious terror attacks in Indian history in Mumbai during 26th-29th November 2008 by terror groups operating from Pakistani territory, India responded with immense restraint by giving diplomacy a chance. <sup>3</sup> After the 1998 nuclear test, it was initially felt that a deterrence equation might have evolved between the two countries, forcing them to abstain from full-fledged conventional wars. India – Pakistan deterrence is premised on 'existential deterrence' by which both countries are assumed to be mutually deterred by their nuclear arsenals, though neither side has declared the strength of their arsenals, thus placing their adversaries in constant doubt about their strength. US President Obama in his very first articulation of his world view, he argued: "I will join our allies in insisting, not simply requesting, that Pakistan crack down on the Taliban, pursue Osama bin Laden and his lieutenants, and end its relationship with all terrorist groups. At the same time, I will encourage dialogue between India and Pakistan to work towards resolving their dispute over Kashmir and between."<sup>4</sup> Obama appears to be offering U.S. diplomatic activism on Kashmir in return for Islamabad's cooperation in fighting al Qaeda and Taliban. His argument was simple: the comprehensive normalization of Indo-Pak relations will stabilize and accelerate India's own rise as a great power.

**Kashmir Issues:** Kashmir has been a bone of contention for India and Pakistan since the partition of the subcontinent in 1947. Despite the stalemate having proven costly, the two countries have failed to cooperate. Managing Kashmir militarily has been a huge burden on the economy of both countries and is also one of the biggest hurdles in their economic and social development. The Kashmir conflict is not a simple inter-state territorial dispute, which involves two clearly defined parties with two choices. Along with India and Pakistan, it involves intra-state and international

actors whose role is also very important in the final outcome. The United States, China, freedom fighters, Kashmiri governments in the two parts of Kashmir, and the people of the state are the other stakeholders. Pakistan, once a part of India, is now its important neighbor but their relation has been always revolved around Kashmir. In the post-cold war era the situation has become more intense. The Kashmir Dispute is the center of gravity for Pakistan's Cold War with India which brought India and Pakistan very close to a third war in 1990. Many consider Kashmir the most probable nuclear flashpoint in the world today. It is worth giving a brief historical background of the dispute to understand its intractability and why an accidental nuclear exchange could erupt from it. Its origins can be traced to 1947, when subcontinent was partitioned upon the British colonial withdrawal and two independent states, India and Pakistan were created. The British succeeded in settling most territorial disputes except Kashmir. Since then, Indo-Pakistani relations have remained hostage to this problem. Immediately after independence, a war broke out between India and Pakistan over Kashmir as both wanted to take control of the territory. The war ended through a UN-mediated cease-fire agreement, but Kashmir became divided with two-thirds under Indian control and the rest under Pakistani control. India and Pakistan fought a third war in 1971. In that conflict, Pakistan lost its eastern wing, which emerged as independent Bangladesh. Following the war, the two countries signed the Simla Accord in 1972 which placed India in an advantageous position in regards to the Kashmir issue. Under the terms of the treaty, both parties agreed to settle all outstanding disputes 'peacefully through negotiations'. This, according to New Delhi, provided a new formula to settle the Kashmir dispute which fundamentally replaced the UN resolution. The Accord, in New Delhi's interpretation, ruled out extra-regional involvement in the resolution of the Kashmir dispute. Since 1972, New Delhi has used the Kashmir Accord as the main reference point to resolve the Kashmir dispute. Since 1947, New Delhi has consistently maintained that Kashmir is an Integral Part of the Indian Union. The inclusion of Kashmir within India was legitimized by the treaty of accession signed by the ruler of Kashmir Maharaja Hari Singh and New Delhi on 26th October 1947.

In the India – Pakistan context, Islamists argue that Kashmir is a symbol, not the root cause of India- Pakistani conflict. They Point to General Parvez Musharraf's statement made as the chief of army staff in April 1999. "Even a settlement of the Kashmir issue will not usher in peace in the region. Low intensity conflict against India will continue because India is a large hegemonic power." This reinforces the view that the India-Pakistan conflicted is rooted in history, religion, culture and politics of revenge. There cannot be peace in the region as long as anti-state actors subscribe to the Islamic caliphate and Pakistan to the two-nation theory and political power in Pakistan is exercised by the army, the mullahs and the feudal lords in the name of jihad, Islam, and Kashmir. In his book 'The Shade of Swords' a noted author and commentator, M.J. Akbar, concedes that Pakistan's anger against India is larger than the problem over Kashmir. From Lahor Agreement in 1999 until the restoration of civilian rule in Pakistan in February 2008 and Mumbai attacks in November 2008, much water has flown down the Indus. There is a perception within as well as outside Pakistan that Lahor Agreement marked the beginning of a

process that led to a perceptible shift in Islamabad's approach towards Kashmir. Pakistan official policy towards Kashmir has been centered on the 47th resolution of the UN Security Council. Pakistan derives its stance from its own perception of history like (a) Kashmir is the core issue, (b) the Muslim majority princely state of J & K should have naturally formed part of Pakistan, (c) India has occupied this territory by force and fraud against the wishes of its people, (e) The UN resolutions recognize the Kashmiri people's right to self-determination and etc. however there are other important elements that are left unsaid or under-emphasized, which indicate the limits of the Kashmir policy like (a) the territory to be negotiated may not include Northern Areas (Gigit, Baltistan, Huzan and Nagar), which were part of the princely state of J & K at the time of partition. (b) The term 'Kashmiri' is also not clearly defined as to whether it includes the populations from the whole of the J & K state, as it was obtained during the rule of Hari Singh, or denote only the people of Kashmir valley, (c) the Kashmir's will exercise their 'right to self-determination' only to determine Kashmir's accession to either India or Pakistan. They do not have the right to independence and etc. The Pakistan had also counted once again on internationalizing the Kashmir issue through their intervention in Kargil. Unfortunately for them, their plan backfired. The international community reacted adversely to their Trans LOC adventurism and called for an immediate pullback of their forces. During their G-8 summit at Cologne in June 1999, the world leaders stopped just short of calling Pakistan an aggressor and reiterated that India and Pakistan should respect the LOC and must resolve their problems bilaterally through dialogue. The G-8 statement amounted to strong indictment of Pakistan's transgression of the LOC. What came as an even greater shock to Pakistan was that China, a long-time ally, chose to adopt a strictly neutral position on the Kargil intrusions and steadfastly refused to back Pakistan despite personal visits to Beijing by the Pakistani prime minister, foreign minister and chief of army staff. Once the major world powers expressed their support for India, by tacit implication even if not in a forthright manner, India has categorically stated that there can be no political negotiations with Pakistan till the intrusions in Kargil district are completely eliminated. The world is gradually coming around to accepting this justifiable Indian view. Kargil crisis put the international community on a sharp alert, particularly due to the prospects of nuclear conflagration. Fearing that the situation could spin out of control, western governments, the UN, Japan and Russia urged caution and appealed to the two sides to pull back. International concern focused on protecting the fledgling confidence building measures, which were set up in Lahore Summit. In an unending conflict, players cannot be sure when the last interaction between them will take place. In such a situation, cooperation is quite probable. Kashmir also appears to be an unending conflict. For over 60 years, both India and Pakistan have mostly adopted the defection strategy, playing the PD game as a chess game. However, the realization has recently dawned upon the leadership of India and Pakistan that if they continue fighting over Kashmir in the same manner, it will lead them nowhere. It appears from the developments in the last decade or so that the leadership in both countries has realized that total victory is not possible, even in a distant future and they cannot run away from the dispute either.

**Terrorism Issues:** The origins of state sponsored terrorism in Pakistan could be traced to Soviet Military intervention in Afghanistan in 1979. Soviet intervention in Afghanistan weakened the US presence in the region. In these circumstances Saudi Arabia and Pakistan became US allies in its mission to repel the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The US provided technology and sophisticated weapons, Saudi Arabia provided money and Pakistan became a hub for recruiting and training Mujahedeen groups.

**Confidence-building measure (CBMs):** CBMs are state practices that are intended to increase the level of trust and to lower the likelihood of conflict. It is believed that through communication, constraints, transparency and verification, and CBMs, the behavior of state became more predictable. These measures have usually followed crisis events. These agreements are scattered over the 13 year under consideration and have been concluded by governments articulating both the secular and religious culture national identity these CBMs include military CBMs,

**Military CBMs:** India and Pakistan completed the ratification process of Indo-Pak agreements on prohibition of attacks on each other's nuclear installations and facilities in 27 January, 1991. Since then, as stipulated in the agreements, India and Pakistan have exchange list of nuclear installations and facilities every year.

#### **Economic relations**

**Trade between India and Pakistan:** Contiguous countries around the world share a congenial trading environment, with high values of bilateral trade. However, trade between India and Pakistan has always been linked to the political relations the two countries share, than being merely governed by economic factors. Following the independence and partition in 1947, Indo-Pakistan trade fell severely; and came to a standstill for almost nine years in the aftermath of the war in 1965. A protocol on carrying on of trading relations was signed in 1974 on a list of mutually agreed items. In 1996, India accorded Most Favored Nation (MFN) status to Pakistan thereby offering Pakistan the same trading regime as it offers to any other country in the world. Pakistan, on the other hand, continued to allow imports of a limited number of items from India, collectively known as the positive list; although the number of items on the list has increased gradually. The grant of MFN was linked to the resolution on the Kashmir issue. Moreover, India stopped trade via the air and land routes between 2001 and 2004 following the attack on Indian parliament in December 2001. However, even after SAFTA was ratified in 2006, Pakistan did not accord MFN status to India and continued to trade on the positive list, allowing import of only 137 items from India via road, thereby making the route more restrictive. Thus with the two largest SAARC countries not trading under MFN rules, SAFTA has failed at helping normalize trade relations between India and Pakistan.

#### **Conclusion and Suggestions**

The India-Pakistan Relations is one of the most complex bilateral relations in the world. Innumerable factors design to push these bilateral ties on the boiling pot. The nefarious colonial designs and weak internal political will invariably create problems in identifying simple solutions of the



lingering issues. In historical perspective it is clear that India and Pakistan is the core states of South Asia which are culturally similar linguistically unite geographically closed and historically related. But it is strange that despite the geographical, historical and cultural similarity the relations between these two states not so much smooth and peaceful. The demand for Pakistan was itself based on distrust. Roots of this kind of relationship between India-Pakistan can be seen in the colonial history of Indian subcontinent. British colonial rules established a tradition by the partition of this subcontinent that creates a chain of struggles, disputes and instability in the region. Bilateral relations between India and Pakistan are undoubtedly the most important in South Asia and the world also. But relations among both states not at all smooth in nature and has been full of ups and downs. Now the both countries are overtly nuclear powered, they poses greater risk, if the ongoing crisis is not resolved. Difficulties in their relations arise mainly because their differences are not rooted in legal and constitutional interpretations and misunderstanding, but in geography, emotional legacies past history and their divergent views on the doctrine of two - nation theory. The leaders of the both the states are responsible for creating this kind of psyche, which cause the differences.

From the very beginning, the two powers became involved in a conflict ridden relationship over the status of the former princely - state of Jammu and Kashmir and forced immigrate of thousands of Hindu and Muslim into the new countries which affected both emerging countries. The dispute has proved severely oppose to resolution because, at bottom, it is infused with the self-images of the two states. Pakistan deemed its identity as a Muslim homeland incomplete without Kashmir; while India sees it control over this Muslim-majority state as a demonstration of its secular identification. This tense relationship has resulted in three major wars (1947-48, 1965, 1971) and a limited one (1999). There is a huge potential for the expansion of bilateral trade between India and Pakistan, especially now that the long-standing issue of Pakistan granting Most Favored Nation status India seems closer than ever to being resolved. Regarding the development of the nuclear policies of the two countries both have adopted a policy of minimum deterrence. Though this did not deter the two states from clashing for instance the Kargil War and nuclear race is going on but is has also been realized by both the countries that the probability of using the nuclear force against the other is little. Here it is pertinent to mention that if nuclear force is used it would be disastrous for both the countries. In the last decade of this century it was accepted that both India and Pakistan had a nuclear military capability.

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