2025, Vol. 7, Issue 9, Part D

India’s federal system, while constitutionally designed to balance powers between the Union and the states, has often revealed tensions in the management of shared natural resources. Water, classified as a state subject, is also influenced by Union powers, particularly in cases of interstate rivers. This paper examines the case of Punjab to highlight the complexities of federalism and water disputes in India. The study underscores how Punjab represents a unique situation: its river waters were allocated to non-riparian states such as Haryana and Rajasthan, despite the absence of a constitutional mandate. The research objective is to analyze how constitutional provisions, legislative measures such as the Punjab Reorganization Act (1966), and central notifications in 1955, 1976, and 1981 shaped Punjab’s water allocations and their political consequences. Methodologically, the study relies on historical analysis of legislative documents, government notifications, tribunal frameworks, and secondary scholarly sources to trace the evolution of Punjab’s water disputes. The findings reveal that central interventions in Punjab’s river water allocations often bypassed constitutional mechanisms, weakening the federal balance and imposing political and economic costs on the state. The decline of canal irrigation, overreliance on groundwater, and the deepening agrarian crisis illustrate the ecological consequences of these policies. Politically, these allocations exacerbated tensions between Punjab and the Union, fueling demands for federal autonomy and contributing to episodes of unrest. In conclusion, the Punjab case illustrates how India’s federal structure permits the Union government to exercise authority flexibly, sometimes unitary and sometimes federal, depending on political expediency. The study calls for a more consistent and equitable framework for water governance that respects both constitutional principles and the sustainability of state resources.