Defections and dominance: Understanding Nigeria’s presidential elections through the lens of legal cartel theory
Author(s): Gbolahan Solomon Osho and Michael O Adams
Abstract: This paper examines the politics and strategic behavior underlying presidential elections in Nigeria through the lens of legal cartel theory. By analyzing the 2015, 2019, and 2023 elections. The study identifies political defection among elites not as ideological betrayal but as a rational recalibration within a cartelized system. Legal cartel theory developed by Katz and Mair posits that dominant political parties evolve into state-subsidized cartels that manipulate legal and institutional frameworks to entrench their dominance. In Nigeria, this is manifested through practices such as deregistration of parties by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), zoning arrangements, and campaign finance regulations that favor incumbent parties. Through qualitative analysis of party constitutions, electoral laws, media content, and elite behavior, the study shows how defection is used strategically to maintain access to legal immunity, political patronage, and proximity to power. The findings reveal that such cartel behavior weakens democratic accountability, reduces voter confidence, and limits ideological diversity in the political system. The study concludes with policy recommendations including electoral reform, internal party democracy, and civic awareness initiatives to curb political cartelization and strengthen Nigeria’s democratic integrity.
Gbolahan Solomon Osho, Michael O Adams. Defections and dominance: Understanding Nigeria’s presidential elections through the lens of legal cartel theory. Int J Political Sci Governance 2025;7(8):248-255. DOI: 10.33545/26646021.2025.v7.i8d.650
