The political economy of legitimacy: A theoretical framework on the effect of legitimacy on favouritism in distribution
Author(s): Fariha Tabassum
Abstract: Legitimacy forms the cornerstone of democratic governance and ensures that the exercise of political power reflects the consent and confidence of the governed. While a substantial body of literature has examined the determinants and consequences of political legitimacy, the effects of legitimacy on the use of favouritism in distributive politics remain underexplored. This study addresses this gap in the literature by theorizing a link between the lack of legitimacy of governments and their propensity to use favouritism as a political strategy. It argues that a deficit in legitimacy generates political insecurity among incumbents, increasing their likelihood of resorting to favouritism in the distribution of public resources to consolidate support. Drawing upon theoretical insights from the political business cycle and distributive politics literature, the study posits that weak legitimacy correlates with higher levels of favoritism in distribution. The arguments contribute conceptually to two streams of studies in politics: legitimacy and distributive politics. They highlight how legitimacy not only influences macroeconomic performance but also shapes the micro-political calculus of incumbents. The paper concludes that political insecurity arising from weak legitimacy incentivizes short-term favouritism, which, paradoxically, may further lessen institutional trust and political stability.
Fariha Tabassum. The political economy of legitimacy: A theoretical framework on the effect of legitimacy on favouritism in distribution. Int J Political Sci Governance 2025;7(10):211-215. DOI: 10.33545/26646021.2025.v7.i10c.724
